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I have read countless books and articles on direct democracy, but few have
more astutely and accurately reflected the goals and aspirations of Progressive
Era reformers pushing for the establishment of direct democracy in the United
States than has chapter 1 of this book. Smith and Tolbert have taken an inter

esting approach in outlining what they perceive the original supporters of
direct democracy hoped the educative impact of the process would be and
then analyzing whether these hopes actually materialized. Chapter 2 takes the
first stab at this by reviewing the impact that direct democracy has on voter
turnout. The conclusions presented in this chapter reinforce existing research
that shows that voters are more likely to participate in the electoral process
when direct democracy is practiced in the state. Chapter 3 is a natural continu
ance of the previous chapter, with a review of what I call "voter competence."
Smith and Tolbert conclude that "people in states with frequent ballot questions
are more informed about politics_" Chapters 4, 5, and 6, as I stated earlier,
are not as strong as the other chapters. These chapters deal with the impact
of direct democracy on citizens' confidence in government, the education of
special interests, and the education of political parties. The data contained in
these chapters are cutting-edge research, but the findings are not as convincing
as those of the other chapters. However, I commend the authors for their ef
forts; the information contained in the chapters is enlightening and thought
provoking. The final chapter does an excellent job of tying it all together and
ends with a profound statement: "If history be our guide, the educative effects
of citizen lawmaking may provide renewed excitement about the possibilities

for democratic governance."
There have, of course, been other books written on this subject. Other
researchers and writers who have done a great job in this area are Professors
John Matsusaka, Beth Garrett, Liz Gerber, Skip Lupia, and Dan Lowenstein,

to name just a few. I digress in listing these other researchers only as a means
of making the point that Smith and Tolbert have written a book that both com
plements the work of these other notable individuals and proves that the quality
of research on this important topic is finally reaching the levels it deserves.

M. Dane Waters
The Initiative & Referendum Institute

Passing the Buck: Congress, the Budget, and Deficits by Jasmine Far
rier. Lexington, University Press of Kentucky, 2004. 284 pp. $40.00.

Jasmine Farrier sets out to understand why Congress "tells the country that
it is not well suited to making tough decisions on major policy questions" such
as declaring war or controlling spending (p. 1). She does so by analyzing how
it structured the budget process from 1974 to 1996.
Budgeting involves tough policy choices because voters want spending,
but not taxes or large deficits. In 1974, in the shadow of Watergate and "the Im
perial Presidency," the legislators took responsibility by establishing a process
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through which Congress was supposed to face squarely the deficit that would
result from the spending items contemplated. Yet, in 1985, in the shadow of
unpopular deficits, the legislators prospectively shed responsibility through

Gramm-Rudman-Hollings by empowering the General Accounting Office
(GAO) to cut spending if deficits exceeded predetermined limits. When the
Supreme Court ruled that the GAO could not be given this executive power,
Congress, in 1987, reassigned it to the Office of Management and Budget?one
of the bastions of "the Imperial Presidency." The Budget Enforcement Act of
1990 and the Line-Item Veto Act of 1996 shifted power in other ways from
Congress to either the president or automatic mechanisms. The Supreme Court
invalidated this "veto" also.
Farrier argues, and convincingly so, that prevalent theories of delegation
fail to account for much of the post-1974 legislation. The principle-agent the
ory?in which the majority in Congress cedes power to an agent likely to work
its will?is contradicted by Congress ceding power to a president of the opposite
party. The transactions cost theory?in which Congress delegates to reduce
transaction costs, but does not delegate distributional choices?is contradicted
by its ceding distributional choices.
To explain why Congress sheds budget responsibility, Farrier looks to "an
under-utilized source of legislative intent: the historical record" (p. 6). She
finds the legislators repeatedly claiming incompetence to budget wisely. For

example, Senator William Cohen cracked: "Stop us before we spend again"

(pp. 1,165). The legislators may, of course, only be pretending incompetence in
order to justify shedding responsibility for tough budget cuts. In this way, they

position themselves to say "yes" to popular spending requests and "no" to
unpopularly large deficits, which truly is to have one's balanced budget cake

and eat it too.

Farrier urges Congress to "do a much better job of explaining to citizens
the real challenges" instead of abdicating its constitutional responsibilities
(p. 220). There is, however, a design flaw in the Constitution when it comes
to spending. The Framers' response to the threat of factions?and spending
is, of course, a problem of factions?was that faction would counter faction.
So long as Congress balanced the budget?and it did so, except during emergen
cies, long after the Constitution was written?it could satisfy a plea for spending
from one faction only by taking the money away from another. When Congress

gained the political latitude and access to credit markets necessary to run
huge intentional deficits in the absence of an emergency, faction no longer
checked faction.

Congress is, however, competent to design legislative mechanisms that
would put discipline back into the appropriations process. Legislators do not
want voters to know that, but perhaps, in her next book, Jasmine Farrier could
spill the beans by showing precisely how Congress could organize itself to have
a backbone. In the meantime, her present book is a highly informative read.

David Schoenbrod

New York Law School and Cato Institute
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